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Abstract 
This paper examines the deployment of a shared CO2 transportation infrastructure 
needed to support the combined emergence of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). We develop a 
cooperative game-theoretic approach to: (i) examine the conditions needed for its 
construction to be decided, and (ii) determine the break-even CO2 value needed to build 
such a shared infrastructure. In particular, we highlight that, as biogenic emissions are 
overlooked in currently-implemented carbon accounting frameworks, BECCS and CCS 
emitters face asymmetric conditions for joining a shared infrastructure. We thus further 
examine the influence of these carbon accounting considerations by assessing and 
comparing the break-even CO2 values obtained under alternative accounting rules. We 
apply this modeling framework to a large contemporary BECCS/CCS case-study in 
Sweden. Our results indicate that sustainable and incentive-compatible cooperation 
schemes can be implemented if the value of CO2 is high enough and show how that 
value varies depending on the carbon accounting framework retained for negative 
emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operators. In the most advantageous 
scenario, the CO2 value needs to reach 112€/tCO2, while the current Swedish carbon tax 
amounts to 110€/tCO2. Overall, these findings position pragmatic policy 
recommendations for local BECCS deployment. 
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1. Introduction 
Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) are key to reaching the “below 2°C” global warming target in most Integrated 
Assessment Model scenarios (Koelbl et al. 2014; Nemet et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018). A number of 
studies also emphasize the role BECCS and CCS may play in reaching carbon neutrality in Europe by 
2050 (see, e.g., Kalkuhl et al. 2015 or Solano Rodriguez et al. 2017). Indeed, while CCS is expected to 
mitigate emissions from otherwise difficult to decarbonize industries (Benhelal et al. 2013; Griffin and 
Hammond 2019; IEA 2017), BECCS has the potential to produce both energy and highly needed 
negative emissions (Fuss et al. 2014; Gough and Upham 2011). However, the current uptake of these 
technologies remains limited and barely compatible with the ambitious development plans depicted in 
the scenarios (Nemet et al. 2018).  
The barriers to the up-scaling of BECCS and CCS are mostly economic, political, and social rather 
than technical, as some carbon capture, transport, and storage technologies are already in commercial 
stages (Hammond 2018). One of these crucial yet often-overlooked barriers is the implementation of a 
CO2 transportation and storage system (Krahé et al. 2013; Stavrakas et al. 2018), which is, by nature, 
costly, capital intensive, and likely to exhibit substantial economies of scale. These properties 
effectuate the use of a shared infrastructure that requires cooperation between the industrial CO2 
emitters and raises the question of cost allocation. 
The purpose of this paper is thus to examine the conditions for the construction of a CO2 
transportation and storage infrastructure for BECCS and CCS emitters. We develop a cooperative 
game-theoretic approach to examine the coordination issues faced by a collection of heavy-emitting 
industrial plants that can install carbon capture capabilities and join a common CO2 supply chain. 
Additionally, the influence of two parameters is assessed: the accounting system applied to negative 
emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operator – which can be either vertically integrated or 
vertically separated.  
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This paper contributes to the small, and very much needed, literature attempting to shed light on 
CO2 infrastructures economics. In recent years, the deployment of CO2 infrastructure systems has 
yielded an emerging body of literature that can be clustered in two categories, depending on the 
methodology retained for the analysis: optimization or game theory. Optimization-based analyses are 
by far the most numerous ones (e.g., Bakken and Velken 2008; Middleton and Bielicki 2009; Kemp 
and Kasim 2010; Klokk et al. 2010; Mendelevitch et al. 2010; Kuby et al. 2011; Morbee et al. 2012; 
Oei et al. 2014; Oei and Mendelevitch 2016). In these contributions, a single decision-maker (modeled 
as a benevolent social planner) is posited to control the entire value chain, including all the agents 
involved (e.g., the emitters where carbon capture is implemented or the countries in the case of an 
international value chain). Remarking that the latter agents are autonomous decision-making entities, a 
handful of contributions have recently emerged to investigate whether cooperation can be a rational 
move for these agents using game-theoretic notions. For example, Morbee (2014) analyzes the 
country-level negotiation process needed to develop a pan-European CCS infrastructure using a 
Shapley value approach. Massol et al. (2015) focus on the individual emitters’ decisions to adopt 
carbon capture capabilities and clarifies the conditions for sharing of the infrastructure costs among 
them. In a subsequent contribution, Massol et al. (2018) examine the case of a collection of 
independent industrial clusters that can be connected to a meshed, national pipeline network aimed at 
transporting CO2 to a few capacity-constrained storage sites. Overall, it is important to stress that the 
literature on CO2 infrastructures has been primarily motivated by purely CCS applications and thus 
overlooks the possibility of installing a combined BECCS/CCS chain. The present paper extends these 
earlier analyses to study the associated gain/cost-sharing problem. 
The scenarios based on the nature of the infrastructure operator allow us to position pragmatic 
policy recommendations for local BECCS deployment. But, more importantly, the scenarios based on 
different negative emissions accounting frameworks address an essential barrier to BECCS 
deployment: the lack of economic incentives for the deployment of BECCS. Bio-energy-fuelled 
industries are yet out of the scope of any carbon accounting framework because they have long been 
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considered carbon-neutral – meaning that the volume of CO2 that is removed from the atmosphere 
through biomass growth corresponds to the volume of CO2 emissions released during combustion 
(Fuss et al. 2014). As a result, the CO2 captured in BECCS facilities is neither eligible for tax 
reductions nor rewarded by carbon quota allowances.  
However, at least two lines of arguments indicate that one ton of stored CO2 emissions from a 
BECCS facility can hardly equate one ton of negative emissions, which is defined as the net volume of 
CO2 emissions that is permanently removed from the atmosphere. First, producing negative emissions 
and abating one’s emissions are two different activities. For a CCS plant, the volume of captured CO2 
roughly corresponds to its abated emissions, once the capture process emissions are deduced. But in 
the case of BECCS processes, the production of CO2 removal from the atmosphere must be accounted 
for in a full Life Cycle Assessment perspective, including emissions from the agroforestry sector 
(Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2017; Thornley and Mohr 2018). Second, only a fraction of CO2 removal 
will stay permanently out of the atmosphere – and therefore become negative emissions – because of 
the complex dynamics of global carbon cycles (Jones et al. 2016).  
A growing literature has been addressing this critical problem and proposes accounting and 
rewarding alternatives for BECCS and negative emissions (IEAGHG 2014; Ricci 2012; Torvanger 
2019; Zakkour et al. 2014). Regardless of the policy instrument (tax, market mechanism, or subsidy), 
it is argued that negative emissions should be rewarded identically to abated emissions to ensure a 
cost-effective mitigation system. In particular, these considerations led Torvanger (2019) to reflect on 
the suitable carbon accounting values that should be retained for negative CO2 emissions:  “Given the 
complexities and insufficient understanding of calculating the net negative effect of CO2 removal due 
to interactions with the global carbon cycle, the best way forward is likely to agree on a discounting 
factor for negative emissions, and then also for BECCS. This implies that less than 100% of one ton of 
CO2 removal is approved.” Therefore, the added value of the analysis of a shared BECCS and CCS 
infrastructure deployment – rather than CCS only – lies in the asymmetric conditions for joining the 
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infrastructure; BECCS facilities may be rewarded less than CCS facilities for the same volume of 
sequestered CO2. This is captured in our model by several scenarios on the fraction of CO2 emissions 
stored by BECCS facilities that can be considered as negative emissions. 
Finally, we apply our model to a realistic case study in the south-west of Sweden, a region that is 
especially relevant for the following three reasons: (i) it is home to both biomass-fuelled pulp and 
paper plants and large industries that could be equipped with carbon capture capabilities (EEA 2017); 
(ii) it is geographically close to a sizable underground CO2 storage site that is currently being 
developed offshore Norway (CCS Norway 2019); and (iii) a private sector-led initiative is now 
examining the possibility of deploying a dedicated CO2 transportation infrastructure connecting these 
Swedish emitters with the Norwegian storage site (Global CCS Institute 2019; Preem 2019).  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the conceptual framework of our 
analysis. In Section 3, we detail an application of this methodology to the case of a contemporary 
project in Sweden and present an overview of the computerized model used to determine the cost of 
the required CO2 transportation infrastructure. Section 4 contains our results. Finally, Section 5 offers 
a summary and some concluding remarks highlighting the policy implications of our analysis. For the 
sake of clarity, the detailed structure of the computerized model and the cost parameters are presented 
in a series of appendices. 
2. Methodology 
In this section, we first present the notation and then the conditions for the construction of a shared 
BECCS/CCS chain that involves a unique private operator controlling both the pipeline infrastructure 
and the maritime shipping of CO2.1 Then, we show how the critical CO2 price needed for the 
implementation of such a combined BECCS/CCS project can be determined. Lastly, we extend the 
                                                     
1
 This specific infrastructure set-up is motivated by the application case study that will be presented in Section 3. 
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analysis to examine the case of a vertically segmented organization whereby the logistics are provided 
by two separate firms: one pipeline operator and one for the maritime shipments. 
2.1 Notation and assumptions 
We consider a finite set of industrial plants that: (i) are eligible to install carbon capture units and 
(ii) can form a shared CO2 transportation system. We assume that each of these CO2 emitters 
represents an autonomous decision-making entity that can either adopt carbon capture and feed the 
volume of CO2 to a shared logistic system or renounce CO2 capture.  
We let N  denote the grand coalition gathering all these emitters and N  denote the cardinality of 
this set. The grand coalition is partitioned in two subgroups CCSN  and BECCSN  respectively gathering 
the CCS and BECCS emitters (i.e., CCS BECCSN N N= ∪  with CCS BECCSN N∩ = ∅ ). 
Let C  be the real-valued function on the subsets of N  that gives the long-run costs for transporting 
the emissions captured by any coalition of emitters to the storage site. Here, ( )C S  denotes the 
standalone cost for serving the coalition S , that is, the costs incurred from building and operating the 
least-costly infrastructure capable of connecting the emitters in S  to the storage site.2 We assume that 
this cost function is subadditive – i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )C S T C S C T∪ ≤ +  for any coalitions ,S T N⊆ , with 
S T∩ = ∅  – and that it verifies ( ) 0C ∅ =  and ( ) 0C S ≥  for any non-empty S  in N . We also assume 
that the technology used in CO2 transportation is standard, not proprietary, and that market entry is 
possible and free in that activity.  
The transportation costs ( )C S  incurred for serving a coalition S  verifies 
( ) ( ) ( )pipeline shipC S C S C S= +  where ( )pipelineC S  and  ( )shipC S  are the costs of the onshore and offshore 
transportation subsystems.  
                                                     
2
 In the empirical section of this paper, the values taken by the function are obtained using an optimization model that is 
solved numerically (see Appendix A). 
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2.2 The provision of a combined and integrated BECCS-CCS infrastructure 
a) CO2 transportation: a cooperative game-theoretic framework 
We posit a subadditive CO2 transportation cost function, which characterizes the natural 
monopolistic nature of that industry (Berg and Tschirhart 1988).3 We also assume that the technology 
is not proprietary and that entry is free in the CO2 transportation industry. Therefore, the pricing 
decisions of a monopolistic organization controlling CO2 transportation has to take into consideration 
the rivalry that could result from the potential entry of a competitor. Following the theory of 
contestable markets (Baumol et al. 1977; Sharkey 1982), a natural monopoly serving the grand 
coalition N  is said to be sustainable if there exists a revenue vector ( )'1,..., Nr r r=  such that: (i) the 
monopoly recovers its costs, and (ii) a potential entrant cannot find any financially viable opportunity 
to serve any submarket S  with S N⊆ . Formally, these conditions for a sustainable monopoly are: 
( )i
i N
r C N
∈
≥  .            (1)  
( )i
i S
r C S
∈
≤ ,   S N∀ ⊂ , { },S N∉ ∅ .      (2) 
Together, these conditions compel the monopolist to charge a revenue vector r  that recovers the 
exact total cost, i.e., ( )ii N r C N∈ = , which indicates that even in the absence of a profit constraint, the 
total revenue charged by that firm cannot depart from its costs (Sharkey 1982). 
In cooperative game theory (see, e.g., Young 1985), the set of revenue vectors that verifies 
conditions (1) and (2) is named the core of the cooperative cost game ( ),N C . A non-empty core thus 
                                                     
3
 An industry is a natural monopoly whenever no combination of multiple firms can collectively provide the industry’s output 
at a lower cost than a monopolist. 
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indicates that the infrastructure operator can charge a revenue vector that recovers its costs while 
preventing the secession of its customers (i.e., the emitters).4  
b) The individual decisions regarding carbon capture  
We now examine the emitters’ decisions regarding the adoption of carbon capture (and thus the 
connection to a shared CO2 transportation system). We let iχ  denote the unit cost for installing and 
operating a carbon capture unit and iQ  the quantity of emissions that can be captured at plant i . We 
also let σ  denote the unit storage cost and 
2CO
p  be the prevailing carbon value. The emitter’s total 
cost thus amounts to ( )i i iQ rχ σ+ + . 
As discussed in Section 2.3., the unit revenue obtained for capturing one ton of CO2 depends on the 
energy source used by the emitter. In the case of fossil fuel (i.e., CCSi N∈ ), that unit revenue is 
2CO
p . 
As discussed in Massol et al. (2015), it is thus judicious for a CCS emitter to adopt carbon capture 
whenever its total revenue5 
2 iCO
Qp  exceeds the total cost incurred for the carbon capture iiQχ , for the 
storage operations6 iQσ  and the amount charged by the infrastructure operator, that is:  
( )2 0i i iCO Q rp χ σ− − ≥− ,   CCSi N∀ ∈       (3) 
In the case of BECCS emitters (i.e., BECCSi N∈ ), we assume that there exists some negative 
emissions accounting framework and that negative emissions are rewarded identically to abated CO2 
emissions. However, as highlighted in the introduction, only a portion of sequestered CO2 may be 
                                                     
4
 From an empirical perspective, it is possible to verify the nonemptiness of the core by solving a linear programming 
problem similar to the one in Massol et al. (2015, Appendix B). 
5
 Note that this model is adapted to the Swedish case study presented in the next section. Following Garðarsdóttir et al. 
(2018), we assume that the emissions caused by the carbon capture process can be neglected because of the low-carbon 
nature of the Swedish electricity system. The rewarded CO2 abatement thus corresponds exactly to the volume of captured 
CO2 emissions.   
6
 We assume that there are no CO2 losses during transport and storage.  
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considered as negative emissions, depending on the process emissions associated with the bio-energy 
chain and the global carbon dynamics. We thus follow Torvanger (2019) and introduce a discounting 
factor τ , with 0 1τ< ≤ , that represents the fraction of sequestered CO2 that can be considered 
negative.7 For a BECCS emitter a non-negative profit is thus obtained when:  
( )2 0i i iCO Q rp χ στ − − ≥− ,   BECCSi N∀ ∈       (4) 
2.3 The break-even price for combined BECCS/CCS adoption 
The implementation of a grand infrastructure connecting all the emitters requires the operator to 
charge a revenue vector that is both in the core of the cooperative cost game ( ),N C  and such that each 
emitter obtains a non-negative profit (i.e., a vector that verifies the conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4)).  
The prevailing carbon price 
2CO
p  has a direct influence on the emitters’ individual profits and, thus, 
on the possibility for the infrastructure operator to determine a revenue vector that is a core allocation. 
One can thus determine the break-even price for combined BECCS/CCS adoption, which is defined as 
the minimum CO2 price that is compatible with conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4). We let 2*COp denote that 
critical value. It can be determined by solving the following linear programming problem: 
LP1 (integrated operator):  
  
2
,
Min
COr p
 
2COp           
  s.t. ( )i
i N
r C N
∈
= ,         
( )i
i S
r C S
∈
≤ ,   { }\ ,S N N∀ ⊂ ∅ ,    
                                                     
7
 As an example, for the BECCS project considered in Fajardy and Mac Dowell (2017), the volume of process emissions 
represents roughly 60% of the volume of stored CO2 emissions. Therefore a discounting factor of 40% should be applied. 
Additionally, if the global carbon dynamics are taken into account, only 60 to 90% of the negative emissions will effectively 
remain out of the atmosphere. In the worst case, the discounting factor would be :  = 40% ∗ 60% = 24% . 
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( )2 0i i iCO Q rp χ σ− − ≥−  ,  CCSi N∀ ∈ ,  
( )2 0i i iCO Q rp χ στ − − ≥− , BECCSi N∀ ∈ . 
0ir ≥ , BECCSi N∀ ∈ . 
2.4 Extension: The case of a vertically-separated transportation chain  
The analysis above posits the existence of a single operator controlling both the onshore and the 
offshore components of the supply chain. However, pipeline systems and sea-going vessels are 
different activities, which can justify a vertically separated organization with two specialized 
operators. Such a separated industrial structure calls for an adaptation of our modeling framework, and 
the four lines of considerations below have to be considered.  
First, regarding the pipeline operator, we let ( )'1 ,..., Nt t t=  denote the revenue vector it charges. To 
be financially viable that operator has to recover its costs and, because of the threat resulting from our 
free entry assumption, that firm cannot charge more than its costs. Thus, the condition 
( )i pipei N t C N∈ =  has to be verified.  
Second, regarding the shipping operator, similar considerations related to cost recovery and free 
entry also compel that firm to charge a total revenue that exactly recovers its total cost ( )shipC N , which 
we assume to be decomposable into a fixed component shipf  and a variable one with a constant 
marginal cost equal to shipc . Furthermore, it is important to stress that once transported to the departure 
port, the CO2 emanating from the industrial emitters is fungible, which drastically restricts the 
shipping operator’s ability to implement discriminatory pricing among the emitters. To put it simply, 
that firm can hardly charge different prices for handling a given volume of CO2. As a result, the 
shipping company has to use non-discriminatory pricing schemes. In the sequel, we consider the two 
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usual cases of: (case #1) a single price set equal to the average shipping cost (i.e., ( )ship ii NC N Q∈ ) 
and (case #2) a two-part tariff that includes a fixed charge set to recoup the fixed cost8 and a variable 
component with a slope set equal to the marginal shipping cost.9  
Third, because of the entry considerations above, the total amount jointly charged by the pipeline 
and shipping operators to any coalition S  cannot exceed the standalone cost ( )C S  it would incur with 
a potential entrant.  
Lastly, the emitters’ individual decisions to implement carbon capture (and thus the individual net 
benefits in conditions (3) and (4)) have to account for the sum of the total revenues charged by the 
pipeline and the shipping operators.  
Altogether, these considerations indicate that, in the case of vertical separation, the break-even 
price for a combined BECCS/CCS adoption can be determined using an adapted version of the linear 
programming problem above.  
If the shipping operator is compelled to use average cost pricing, the break-even price for a 
combined BECCS/CCS adoption is the solution of the following optimization problem.  
LP2 (average cost pricing for CO2 shipping):   
2
,
Min
COt p
 
2COp           
  s.t. ( )i pipe
i N
t C N
∈
= ,         
                                                     
8
 Accordingly, the fixed cost shipf  incurred by the shipping firm is simply apportioned into N  equal shares.  
9
 In case of a linear cost function (as in the present) case, the proposed two-part pricing scheme is identical to the serial cost-
sharing mechanism proposed in Moulin and Shenker (1992).   
 12 
 
 
( ) ( )shipi i
i S ii N
C N
t Q C SQ∈ ∈
 
+ ≤ 
 
 


,   { }\ ,S N N∀ ⊂ ∅ , 
  ( ) ( )2 0shipi i
ii
i i
N
CO
C N
t Q QQp χ σ
∈
− −− − ≥

,   
CCSi N∀ ∈ ,  
( ) ( )2 0shipi i
iN
i i
i
CO
C N
t QQ Qp χ στ
∈
− −− − ≥

,  
BECCSi N∀ ∈ . 
Under a two-part pricing scheme for shipping, one can solve the following problem to determine 
the break-even price for a combined BECCS/CCS adoption.  
LP3 (two-part pricing for CO2 shipping):   
2
,
Min
COt p
 
2COp           
  s.t. ( )i pipe
i N
t C N
∈
= ,         
( )shipi ship i
i S
f
t c Q C S
N∈
 
+ + ≤  
 
 ,   { }\ ,S N N∀ ⊂ ∅ , 
( )2 0shipi shii pi iCO fQ t c QNp χ σ − −− − ≥− ,   CCSi N∀ ∈ ,  
( )2 0shipi shii i p iCO fQ t c QNp χ στ −−− −− ≥ ,  BECCSi N∀ ∈ . 
3. A Swedish application 
In this section, we first briefly present the Swedish situation regarding the potential for 
BECCS/CCS technologies to clarify both the background and the motivation of our analysis. Then, we 
detail a hypothetical yet realistic combined BECCS/CCS project in Sweden that serves as an 
application to the methodology detailed above.  
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3.1 Sweden as a topical case study 
Sweden presents many features that scaffold BECCS and CCS deployment as an effective 
decarbonization option to meet the nation’s ambitious climate objectives. First, carbon capture 
represents a realistic path. The country’s power sector is already dominated by low emissions 
technologies (nuclear and hydroelectricity). Therefore, decarbonization should take place in other 
sectors. Interestingly, Sweden hosts a number of large carbon-intensive industrial facilities that can 
potentially be equipped with carbon capture capabilities: refineries, petrochemical plants, iron and 
steel factories, cement production (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018).  
Second, Sweden is part of Scandinavia, a region endowed with favorable geology for CO2 storage. 
Mature aquifer storage capacity has been identified in Norway, and a sizable offshore storage site has 
now been developed there as part of an ambitious CCS project labeled Northern Lights (Cozier 2019). 
In its first phase, the project has a domestic nature as it is intended to store up to 1.5 million tons of 
CO2/year (MtCO2/y) captured in the Oslo region. However, given the large size of the storage site, the 
Norwegian authorities and the Northern Lights consortium envision scaling up the project to store CO2 
captured at other industrial clusters and, in particular, at the neighboring ones in Sweden (Global CCS 
Institute 2019). That project is expected to unlock the deployment of carbon capture in Sweden.10  
Last but not least, the emergence of CCS also provides Sweden with an opportunity to unlock its 
BECCS potential. The country is endowed with an important biomass-fueled pulp and paper industry, 
which also represents a primary source of industrial CO2 emissions (EEA 2017). Equipping these 
processing plants with carbon capture units is deemed to be technically feasible (Garðarsdóttir et al. 
2018), and once equipped, the pulp and paper plants may be considered as BECCS. The deployment 
of such BECCS capabilities could provide the country with a credible option for generating negative 
                                                     
10
 Preem – a Swedish oil refining and distribution firm – recently signed an agreement with the Northern Lights consortium 
to deploy a CCS chain. According to Preem’s announcements, a carbon capture unit will be installed at its coastal refinery in 
Lysekil, and the captured CO2 will be shipped to the Norwegian storage site using dedicated sea-going vessels. The 
commencement of these CCS operations is expected in 2020 (Preem, 2019). 
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CO2 emissions. In recognition of this, the government has explicitly listed it as a supplementary 
measure to reach the country’s carbon neutrality target by 2045 (Regeringskansliet 2018). Altogether, 
these specific features make Sweden a realistic case for studying the economics of the combined 
deployment of CCS and BECCS. 
3.2 The emitters, the storage site, and the associated logistics 
As an application, we focus on the south-western part of Sweden, where the emitters could be 
connected to the Northern Lights project in the future. We select all emitters within a 300km range 
from Lysekil11 that have annual emissions volumes larger than 500 ktCO2 per annum, as indicated in 
the 2017 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Report (EEA 2017).  
The resulting list includes seven industrial sites where carbon capture capabilities can be installed 
(see Table 1 and Figure 1 – right). Each of these emitters is labeled from E1 to E7. Three of them have 
a coastal location, in the vicinity of deep-ports in Lysekil (E7), Stenungsung (E3), and Göteborg (E1). 
Conceivably, each of the three ports can be equipped with CO2 loading facilities and is thus considered 
a potential maritime terminal. The four remaining emitters are located in the hinterland (notably, the 
pulp and paper plants located north of the Vänern lake). We suppose that all emissions are directed to 
a single storage site in Norway – the storage site deployed within the Northern Lights project – Figure 
1, left.  
Figure 1: The envisioned BECCS/CCS project: General geography of the emission area in 
Sweden and the Norwegian storage site and the Swedish emission nodes 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Table 1. The industrial facilities under scrutiny 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                     
11
 A CCS project is currently under scrutiny at the Preem refinery in Lysekil Preem (2019) which calls for further appraisal 
of the CCS/BECCS potential in that area. 
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The BECCS/CCS chain in question thus requires the installation of (i) an onshore pipeline system 
aimed at gathering the emissions captured at the industrial sites and transporting them to the Swedish 
ports; and (ii) one or several maritime supply chain(s) based on sea-going vessels transporting the CO2 
from these Swedish ports to the offshore storage site in Norway. Regarding the maritime component 
of the chain, we disregard the possibility of building an offshore pipeline system because the analyses 
in Kjärstad et al. (2016) and Svensson et al. (2004) indicate that shipping provides the cheapest 
technological option for the volume and the distance under scrutiny.  
3.3 Identification of the least-costly infrastructure 
The application of our game-theoretic methodology requires the prior evaluation of the 
infrastructure cost incurred by each subgroup of emitters (see Section 2.2). We thus specify and 
parameterize an optimization problem aimed at determining the least-costly logistics for transporting 
the annual volumes of CO2 captured at a given collection of Swedish emitters to the offshore storage 
site in Norway. We present an overview of the structure of this cost-minimization model below. The 
complete specification of this model is detailed in Appendix A. 
This model aims at choosing the transportation routes (i.e., the pipelines and shipping routes) that 
minimize the total annual equivalent cost of building and operating the transportation and storage 
infrastructure. More precisely, it considers a predefined topology that includes a finite list of nodes 
representing the emitters, the possible maritime terminals, and the offshore storage site, as well as a 
predefined list of arcs representing the candidate pipelines and shipping routes connecting these nodes. 
The list of nodes and candidate routes is detailed in Appendix B. Figure 2 provides an illustration of 
the candidate infrastructure routes. From a cost perspective, each arc is characterized by a fixed and a 
unit cost component (see appendices C and D). Because of the fixed cost, there are arc-specific 
economies of scale.  
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Figure 2: The candidate pipelines and shipping lines 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
This cost-minimization model considers the following decisions. First, the model decides whether a 
given route should be opened or not given its fixed cost of deployment and its annual operating costs. 
That decision is modeled using route-specific binary variables whereby 1 indicates its installation and 
0 means no construction. Second, for each of the installed routes, the model determines the transported 
quantity on that route. Lastly, the model decides the amount of CO2 being injected at the storage site. 
These decisions have to verify a set of linear constraints that represent some fundamental requirements 
(e.g.: the mass balance equation at each node has to be verified; on each route, one cannot transport a 
positive flow of CO2 if the construction of that route has not been decided).     
The parameterization and the data retained in the present application, which are mainly taken from 
recent CCS techno-economic literature, are detailed in appendices C and D. 
4. Results  
In this section, we first present the least-cost design of the CO2 transportation infrastructure and 
then report the break-even prices needed for its deployment obtained under alternative market 
structures and carbon accounting rules for negative emissions.  
4.1 The least-costly infrastructure 
We first use the optimization model above to determine the least-costly infrastructure connecting 
our seven emitters (i.e., the grand coalition N ) with the storage site.  
Figure 3: The least costly infrastructure connecting the seven industrial emitters 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
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The optimal infrastructure consists of a single pipeline system that goes around the Vänerm lake on 
its west side and directs the captured CO2 to a single maritime terminal: E3, a petrochemical plant. As 
a result, we are dealing with a fully-connected pipeline system aggregating all the captured volumes to 
a unique shipping line. This finding is noteworthy, as prior research on optimal CO2 pipeline systems 
has shown that a fragmented infrastructure can also be optimal in cases with different geographical 
set-ups (see Massol et al. (2018) for an illustration in a Spanish case).  
To gain further insights into the economics of that optimal infrastructure, we also report below the 
results obtained for a few remarkable subgroups obtained by partitioning the grand coalition into two 
mutually exclusive subgroups. The first partitioning has a technological nature as we independently 
determine the least-costly infrastructures needed to serve the BECCS and the CCS emitters separately 
(see Figure 4 (a) and (b)). The second one focuses on geography as we independently consider the 
emitters located in the coastal regions and the ones located in the hinterland (see Figure 4 (c) and (d)). 
In all cases, it is preferable to use a single shipping line with a unique departure port. 
A comparison of the cost figures in Figure 4 with the ones reported in Figure 3 confirms the 
subadditive nature of the infrastructure cost function and documents the magnitude of the resulting 
coalitional gains. In all cases, serving the grand coalition with a unique infrastructure is substantially 
cheaper than the sum of the two standalone costs incurred to serve the two subgroups independently. 
The cost of serving the BECCS and the CCS emitters separately is 56% larger than that incurred for 
the grand coalition. Furthermore, if one evaluates the associated average costs, it is instructive to 
remark that CCS emitters could benefit from the addition of BECCS emitters: the average cost 
incurred by CCS emitters in a standalone case (i.e., 31.5€/tCO2) is noticeably larger than that obtained 
in the grand coalition (i.e., 27.6€/tCO2). A similar series of remarks hold in the case of spatial 
partitioning. For hinterland and coastal emitters, the total cost reaches 182,28 M€, which is 50% 
higher than the grand coalition. Coastal emitters are de facto closer to the storage site, but they can 
also benefit from an extended infrastructure connecting the hinterland emitter: their standalone 
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average cost (i.e., 36.4 €/tCO2) is also substantially larger than the 27.6€/tCO2 figure obtained with the 
grand coalition. 
Figure 4 Least costly infrastructure for several noteworthy coalitions, respectively: (a): 
BECCS emitters, (b): CCS emitters, (c): Hinterland emitters, (d): Coastal emitters 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
4.2 Vertical integration vs. vertical separation 
We now report the minimal CO2 price such that a mutually acceptable allocation of the 
infrastructure cost is possible: the break-even CO2 value. We successively consider three alternative 
industrial organizations for the infrastructure operator: (i) the case of a vertically integrated operator 
controlling both the onshore and offshore components of the logistics; (ii) the case of a vertical 
separation with two dedicated operators with a shipping operator charging a price set equal to its 
average cost; and (iii) the case of a vertical separation with a shipping operator charging the two-part 
tariff discussed in Section 2.4. We assume a discounting factor of  = 100% (i.e., the full volume of 
stored CO2 emissions is considered as negative emissions). Additionally, to gain insights into the 
difficulty of reaching a fair sharing of the infrastructure cost, we also report the simple average cost: 
  =  
∑  +  + 
∗∈
∑   ∈
 = 100.40 €/"#  
Such an average cost calculation de facto overlooks coordination issues but is commonly used by 
practitioners to evaluate the break-even value of a project. We report the results of this method as well 
as the three scenarios mentioned above in Table 2. 
Table 2 Break-even prices obtained under alternative infrastructure operator natures 
($ = %&&% 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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In the case of a vertically integrated infrastructure operator, the necessary break-even CO2 value is 
as low as 112.43€/tCO2 – which is a promising value, knowing that the Swedish carbon tax amounted 
to 110€/tCO2 in 2020 (Government offices of Sweden 2020). Additionally, the break-even CO2 value 
found with the model is at least 12% higher than the average cost. This difference documents the 
additional upwards pressure on the break-even value caused by the difficulty of reaching a mutually 
accepted cooperation among BECCS and CCS emitters. 
Finally, the assumptions of vertically separated operators, either with an average cost or a two-part 
tariff method, increase the break-even value of 4% and 20%, compared to the vertically integrated 
case. These figures position a first noteworthy result: the shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure is 
most feasible – in terms of break-even values – when the infrastructure operator is vertically 
integrated.  
However, when the discounting factor decreases – that is, when a smaller share of negative 
emissions is approved – the relative difference between the scenarios diminishes to the point where 
there is no longer any distinction ( = 75%, Figure 5). This can be explained by the lower revenue 
obtained by BECCS facilities: below a certain discounting factor, the individual non-negative benefit 
constraints (see Section 2.2.b) become so tight that they drive the break-even CO2 value, regardless of 
the nature of the infrastructure operator.  
Figure 5: Break-even values in each scenario, with different discounting factors 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
4.3 The influence of the negative emissions discounting factor  
We now let τ vary between 100% and 10%, with 5% steps, and iteratively solve the linear 
programming problem LP1 with these values. Figure 6 gathers the resulting break-even prices across 
simulations and shows that the deployment of the infrastructure is unrealistic if the discounting factor 
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is too low: the break-even value exceeds 1000€/tCO2 for  = 10%. For  = 40%, the break-even 
value doubles.  
Figure 6. Break-even prices for several discounting factors τ 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
To put these figures into perspective, we derive a sample discounting factor from the assessment of 
a US-switchgrass fueled BECCS system by Fajardy and Mac Dowell (2017). In an optimistic scenario, 
they find that for 1 ton of biogenic CO2 that is geologically stored, 0.6 tons of CO2 is emitted back into 
the atmosphere. We translate this result into a discounting factor of 40%, by considering that only the 
difference between the stored biogenic emissions (1tCO2) and the associated process emissions 
(0.6tCO2) can be considered as negative emissions. If such a discounting factor were applied in our 
case, the break-even CO2 value would reach 250.03€/tCO2. We can portray an even more pessimistic 
view by considering global carbon cycle dynamics. Jones et al. (2016) assess that only 60–90% of 
negative emissions will remain out of the atmosphere in the long term. Hence, in the worst-case 
scenario, the discounting factor of our example may be  = 40% ∗  60% = 24% and may result in a 
break-even CO2 value of around 410 €/tCO2. Negative emissions’ accounting and rewarding thus 
appear to be most influential on the feasibility of a shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure. However, 
they are still inexistent. If such a framework existed, the principal challenge in the deployment of 
BECCS would seem to be the achievement of minimal discounting factors through the design of an 
efficient and sustainable bio-energy supply chain.  
To summarize, three main results can be drawn from our analysis. First, it is in the interest of 
potential BECCS and CCS adopters to cooperate in building a shared infrastructure, as it enables them 
to face lower infrastructure costs. Second, the break-even CO2 value is influenced by the nature of the 
infrastructure operator. The construction of the infrastructure is most feasible (i.e., the break-even CO2 
value is lowest) for a vertically integrated infrastructure operator. Finally, and most importantly, the 
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negative emissions accounting framework has a critical role in the feasibility of the project, as high 
discounting factors put the highest upward pressure on the break-even prices. 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
The investment and operation of carbon capture capabilities represent the highest cost component 
of the BECCS and CCS systems. These capture costs are site-specific, and their precise evaluation 
requires complex engineering studies that have to be conducted using detailed data on each site. That 
limitation is well known in the engineering literature. For example, Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018) – the 
main source used in the present study (see Appendix C) – provides both an expected value for the unit 
capture cost and a range of ±20% around that value to account for the variability. 
As one could wonder whether that variability may or may not substantially affect the validity of our 
results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis based on a Monte Carlo approach. We assume that the 
capture cost is a normally distributed random variable with a mean equal to the value in Garðarsdóttir 
et al. (2018) and a standard deviation set so that the width of a 99.7%-level confidence interval exactly 
matches the ±20% range evoked in their article. We then randomly and independently draw 1,000 
replicates for the capture cost and combine that sample with our linear programming models to 
generate a sample of break-even CO2 prices. Figure 7 reports the empirical cumulative distribution 
functions of the break-even CO2 prices obtained with the three possible organizations (i.e., integrated 
or vertically separated with the two pricing schemes) and for the case of a less than 100% discount 
factor. The results are completely consistent with the aforementioned ones as they confirm that: (i) a 
vertically integrated infrastructure statistically requires a lower break-even value than a separated 
infrastructure, and  (ii) a low discounting factor undoubtedly puts the highest upward pressure on the 
break-even value.  
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Figure 7: Empirical cumulative distribution functions  
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE].  
5. Conclusion  
The construction of a large-scale CO2 transport and storage system is an essential issue that 
policymakers should address to support a rapid up-scaling of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture 
(BECCS) as well as fossil Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Accounting for the coordination of 
actors along the value chain is critical for identifying the viable and mutually agreed cooperation 
scheme at a regional level that is needed for accelerating the adoption. Furthermore, although BECCS 
and CCS may share a common CO2 infrastructure, they face different challenges and accounting 
methods. Thinking of a shared deployment of BECCS and CCS, therefore, raises new questions. 
Which infrastructure set-up is most advantageous? How will accounting methods for negative 
emissions affect infrastructure deployment? And what are the conditions under which potential 
BECCS and CCS facilities cooperate?  
This paper builds on a topical Swedish case study to clarify the conditions that enable the 
construction of a shared CO2 transport and storage infrastructure. Using an adapted cooperative game-
theoretic framework, we model the outcomes of the negotiations among emitters and use them to 
determine the critical value of CO2 emissions that makes the construction possible: the break-even 
CO2 value for BECCS and CCS adoption. We find that a sustainable and incentive-cooperation 
scheme can be implemented in the considered Swedish region, assuming a discriminatory CO2 
transport pricing and a high-enough CO2 value. The most advantageous scenario involves a vertically 
integrated infrastructure operator and an identical reward for sequestered CO2 for both BECCS and 
CCS plants. The break-even value then amounts to 112.43€/tCO2.  
Biogenic emissions, however, remain beyond the scope of carbon taxes and markets. We examine 
the effects of possible accounting frameworks by assuming that BECCS emitters are rewarded at the 
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CO2 market price for the negative emissions they produce. These may represent only a fraction of the 
sequestered CO2, and we assume that a discounting factor is applied to the reward attributed to 
BECCS. We find that the break-even price for adoption doubles for a discounting factor around 40%, 
i.e., where only 40% of the stored emissions can be considered negative. This discounting rate is 
consistent with some carbon efficiency calculations for BECCS in the literature.  
These results lead us to position two main policy recommendations on the deployment of a shared 
BECCS and CCS infrastructure. First, a vertically integrated infrastructure is preferred, as it allows a 
more advantageous cost allocation between participants. And second, the creation of a negative 
emissions accounting and rewarding framework is of paramount importance to enable the deployment 
of BECCS; such a framework must be agreed upon internationally in the coming years, in order to 
allow the upscaling of BECCS. Furthermore, if negative emissions produced by BECCS facilities are 
to be rewarded identically to CO2 abatement, BECCS will only become an economically viable 
mitigation option if a large amount of sequestered CO2 can be considered negative. Therefore, a 
sustainable and low emitting bio-energy value chain needs to be incentivized with an international 
sustainable biomass certification framework.  
Notwithstanding the value of our findings, our analysis can be extended in several directions. For 
instance, an implicit premise of our model is that all emitters are simultaneously connected to the 
infrastructure. As the historical evidence gained from other infrastructure networks (e.g., natural gas or 
electricity) indicates that infrastructure can grow organically from a small territory to a larger one by 
gradually connecting adjacent users, future research could explore the conditions for such an organic 
deployment of BECCS and CCS infrastructures. Given the importance of capacity constraints in 
pipeline-based transportation techniques, one could also explore the need for an optimal degree of 
overcapacity on some critical components of the infrastructure (e.g., on some important transportation 
corridors). As that overcapacity is likely to be costly, another strand of research could also extend the 
analysis to examine the (fair) recouping of the associated extra-cost. 
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Appendix A – Designing an optimal infrastructure 
This appendix details the specifications of the optimization problem used to determine the least-
cost design of an integrated transportation and storage infrastructure involving both pipelines and 
shipping lines.  
Notation 
To begin with, we define three sets to identify the nodes of the network: 
• { }1,..., ,...,N i N=  the set gathering the emission nodes where emissions are captured; 
• { }1,..., ,...,K k K=  the set gathering the storage nodes where CO2 is injected into an 
underground storage site;12 
• { }1,..., ,...,R r R=  the set of the network routing nodes that are not connected to either 
an emission node or to a storage site. These nodes typically represent an intersection 
between several pipeline links.  
The three sets are mutually exclusive so: N K∩ = ∅ , K R∩ = ∅  and N R∩ = ∅ . For 
notational convenience, we also let N K RΖ = ∪ ∪  denote the macro-set regrouping all the nodes 
and z  is used as a generic notation for a given node in Z . We also let { }1,..., ,...,P p P=  denote the 
set of candidate pipeline links and { }1,..., ,...,L l L=  denote the set of candidate shipping lines.  
We now present the exogenous parameters. 
• iQ  is the total quantity captured and injected into the network at emission node i ;  
                                                     
12
 In the present application, that set has only one element: the Norwegian storage site. That said, the model has a generic 
nature and it could be applied in other cases involving several storage sites.   
 26 
 
 
• kQ  is the maximum amount of CO2 that can be injected into storage k; 
• 
,p zI  is an incidence parameter that only takes three values: -1 if pipeline p  starts at 
node z , 1 if pipeline p  ends at node z , and 0 otherwise; 
• 
,l zJ  is an incidence parameter that only takes three values: -1 if shipping line l  starts at 
node z , 1 if pipeline l  ends at node z , and 0 otherwise; 
• 
pipe
pF  is the fixed cost incurred to open the pipeline link p ; 
• 
pipe
pC  is the unit cost incurred by using pipeline p ; 
• 
ship
lF  is the fixed cost incurred to open the shipping line l; 
• 
ship
lC  is the unit shipping cost incurred by using the shipping line l; 
• 
inj
kC  is the unit cost of the CO2 injection operations conducted at storage k; 
• pipeM  and shipM  are two arbitrarily large constants. Their values will be discussed 
below. 
The decision variables are: 
• pδ  is a binary variable that describes whether the pipeline link p  is opened (i.e., 1pδ = ) 
or closed (i.e., 0pδ = ); 
• pq
+
 (respectively pq− ) is the non-negative quantity transported using pipeline p  that 
flows in the direction posited for pipeline p  (respectively in the opposite direction); 
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• lγ  is a binary variable that describes whether the shipping line l  is opened (i.e., 1lγ = ) 
or closed (i.e., 0lγ = ); 
• 
ship
lq  is the non-negative quantity transported using shipping line l  that flows in the 
direction posited for that line; 
• 
inj
kq  is the non-negative quantity injected into storage k. 
For notational simplicity, we also let ( ), , , , ,ship injN p p p l l kx q q q qδ γ+ −=  be the decision vector to 
transport and store the emissions captured at the emission nodes in N .  
Optimization problem 
The cost-minimizing design of an infrastructure gathering the emissions captured at the emissions 
nodes in N  and transporting them to the storage site can be determined using the following mixed 
integer linear programming problem: 
 Min
Nx
 ( )pipe pipe ship ship ship inj injp p p p p l l l l k k
p P l L k K
Cost F C q q F C q C qδ γ+ −
∈ ∈ ∈
   = + + + + +      (A.1) 
  s.t. ( ), , 0shipp i p p l i l i
p P l L
I q q J q Q+ −
∈ ∈
− + + =  ,   i N∀ ∈ ,  (A.2) 
( ), , ship injp k p p l k l k
p P l L
I q q J q q+ −
∈ ∈
− + =  ,   k K∀ ∈ ,  (A.3) 
( ), , 0shipp r p p l r l
p P l L
I q q J q+ −
∈ ∈
− + =  ,   r R∀ ∈ ,  (A.4) 
p p p pipeq q Mδ+ −+ ≤ ,     p P∀ ∈ ,  (A.5) 
ship
l l shipq Mγ≤ ,      l L∀ ∈ ,  (A.6) 
inj
k kq Q≤ ,      k K∀ ∈ ,  (A.7) 
0injkq ≥ , k K∀ ∈ ; { }0,1pδ ∈ , 0pq + ≥ , 0pq − ≥ , p P∀ ∈  and { }0,1lγ ∈ , 0shiplq ≥ , l L∀ ∈ (A.8) 
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In this optimization problem, the objective function (A.1) to be minimized is the sum of the total 
pipeline costs, the total shipping costs, and the storage annual equivalent cost. The objective function 
is linear, and so are the constraints. The linear constraints (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) respectively represent 
the mass balance equations at the source, storage, and intersection nodes. For each pipeline p , the 
constraint (A.5) forces the binary variable pδ  to be equal to 1 whenever a positive quantity of gas is 
flowing into that pipeline (whatever the flow direction) and imposes a zero flow whenever it is optimal 
to not build it.13 For each shipping line l , the constraint (A.6) forces the binary variable lγ  to be equal 
to 1 whenever a positive quantity of gas is shipped using that shipping line and imposes a zero flow 
whenever it is optimal to not open it. The constraints (A.7) represent the sink injectivity constraints: at 
each storage node, the quantity injected cannot exceed the local injection capacity.  
We let *Nx  be the solution to that problem. Observe that this solution is such that on each pipeline 
p , at least one of the two directed flows *pq+  and *pq−  must be equal to zero.14  
                                                     
13
 It should be noted that the value of the parameter pipeM  (respectively shipM ) is arbitrarily set at a level that is large 
enough for the constraint (B.5) (respectively (B.6) to be non-binding whenever the pipeline is built (respectively the shipping 
line is iused). In the present case, we assume that these constants equal 10 times the sum of the quantity of CO2 injected at all 
nodes (i.e., ii N Q∈ ). Such « big M » constraints are commonly used in the operations research (O.R.) literature.  
14
 Indeed, we assume that 
*
Nx  is a solution and that there is at least one pipeline 'p  with *' 0pq + >  and *' 0pq − > , we 
consider the decision vector 
**
Nx  where the pipeline flows are the net non-negative flows in each direction 
** * *
' ' '
max( ,0)p p pq q q+ + −= − , ** * *' ' 'max( ,0)p p pq q q− − += −  and the other variables have the same values as the 
ones in 
*
Nx . By construction, 
**
Nx  also verifies the constraints (B.2)–(B.7) while yielding a lower value for the objective 
function (B.1) because ** ** * *
' ' ' 'p p p pq q q q
+ − + −+ = −
 and thus ( ) ( )** ** * *' ' ' ' ' 'pipe pipep p p p p pC q q C q q+ − + −+ < + . Hence, we 
have a contradiction because 
*
Nx  cannot be a solution of the optimization problem. 
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This optimization problem is a mixed-integer linear programming problem). Given its modest size 
in the instances considered in the present study, a numerical solution to that problem can be obtained 
in a few seconds using a standard solver and a laptop.  
Appendix B – Topology  
Our parameterization considers a total of nine nodes including: the seven emission nodes E1 to E7, 
an intersection node labeled R1 that represents a possible network intersection between candidate 
pipelines, and a unique offshore storage site (Table B.1.).  
Table B.1. The nodes 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.1 HERE] 
Regarding onshore transportation, we consider a predefined set of ten candidate pipelines that can 
be installed in that part of Sweden (see Table B.2). These pipelines are located along the region’s main 
transport corridors, and the associated distances range from 30 to 284km, as represented in Table B.2. 
Table B.2. The candidate pipelines and their lengths 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.2 HERE] 
Point-to-point shipping is selected for offshore transportation between the three ports and the 
storage site located on the Norwegian continental shelf. The distance of these shipping lines varies 
between 613 and 641km.15  
Table B.3. The candidate shipping lines and their lengths 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.3 HERE] 
 
                                                     
15
 The shipping line distances were calculated using an online calculator available at https://www.searoutes.com/, using the 
port of Bergen, Norway, as an approximation of the storage site location.  
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Appendix C – Cost data  
In this appendix, we present the cost data used in our study. All costs are reported in €2015 and are 
levelized assuming 25 years of economic lifetime (except when stated otherwise) and a 7.5% discount 
rate. These assumptions are consistent with earlier techno-economic studies (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018; 
Roussanaly et al. 2014; ZEP 2011). 
CO2 capture  
Carbon dioxide capture costs vary significantly depending on the considered sector and technology. 
As an illustration, the techno-economic review carried out by Leeson et al. (2017) provides unit 
capture costs for petroleum refineries ranging from 28.7 to $250/tCO2. Here, we assume that a 
monoethanolamine-based (MEA) CO2 absorption process is implemented.  
CO2 combustion emissions are most cost-effectively captured at stacks with high flue gas 
concentration and volumes. In petroleum refineries, this represents 30% of the total emissions 
(stemming from the H2 production unit), whereas in the pulp and paper industry, 75% of emissions can 
be captured by equipping the recovery boiler. Finally, in the petrochemical plant considered here, 80% 
of emissions may be captured at the cracker furnace (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018). We use specific capital 
cost estimations from the work of Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018), who evaluated CAPEX for a list of 
Swedish emitters, including the seven facilities considered here. The capital cost data shows a visible 
economy of scale (see in particular Figure 5b, Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018). There is little data, however, 
available on operational costs. We therefore use the OPEX calculated for a pulp and paper plant in the 
latter study as an order of magnitude for all plants. Table C.1. gathers the assumed capture rates and 
related CAPEX and OPEX costs for the selection of facilities in our application case.  
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Table C.1. Capture rates and costs in for each emitter (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018) 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.1 HERE] 
In should be noted that in this case, considering the low emissions of the Swedish power system, 
capture costs are close to the cost of avoided CO2 and will be considered equal in this study.  
CO2 transportation: a pipeline system and a maritime supply chain 
Following Morbee et al. (2012) and Massol et al. (2018), the construction cost of an onshore point-
to-point CO2 pipeline infrastructure is assumed to be directly proportional to its length. In the present 
study, we retain the cost parameters presented in Massol et al. (2018).16 The annual equivalent 
investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline with an output of q  MtCO2/y is: ( )0 0A B q τ+ , where 
0 4.6045A =  is the fixed cost coefficient (in million 2015 euros), the variable cost coefficient is 
0 0.1641B =  in 2015 euros per (tCO2×100 km) and τ = 1.1 is the dimensionless terrain correction factor 
described in IEAGHG (2002).17 Concerning O&M, (IEA 2005) indicates operation costs ranging from 
1.0 to 2.5 euros per (tCO2×100 km). We use a value of 1.5 euros per (tCO2×100 km). 
Regarding maritime shipping, we use an empirical function that gives the total annual cost (in 
M€/y) incurred for transporting a given annual flow of CO2 over a given distance. This function has 
been estimated using the cost-engineering data presented in Roussanaly et al. (2014). The estimation 
procedure and the retained specifications are detailed in Appendix D.  
CO2 storage 
We use a cost estimation given for offshore depleted gas oil fields by ZEP (2011), namely 
10€/tCO2 (high-cost scenario). Indeed, the storage site considered in the Northern Lights project will 
                                                     
16
 Original monetary values are in 2010 euros and were corrected for inflation to obtain 2015 euros. 
17
 Here, we assume that the pipelines are installed on cultivated lands which explains the retained value for that parameter.  
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be exploited using existing oil and gas infrastructure on the Norwegian continental shelf (CCS Norway 
2019). In this case, an economic lifetime of 40 years is assumed.  
Appendix D – The cost of maritime transportation  
In the present study, we use an empirical approach to model how the cost of a maritime shipment 
of CO2 varies with the volume shipped and the distance to the storage site.  
The Scandinavian cost engineering literature provides several detailed evaluations of the total 
annual cost of a maritime CO2 supply chain. That chain is aimed at transporting a given annual volume 
of CO2 on a given distance using dedicated sea-going vessels that commute between a departure port 
equipped with specific loading and temporary storage facilities and an offshore site where the CO2 is 
aimed at being stored permanently (Kjärstad et al. 2016; Roussanaly et al. 2014). In this paper, we 
leverage on these detailed cost evaluations to identify an approximate total cost function. More 
specifically, we use the information in Roussanaly et al. (2014), Table 13 – a data set comprising 100 
observations for the unit transportation costs incurred for a supply chain shipping a given volume 
(from 2 to 20 MtCO2/y by regular steps of 2 MtCO2/y) over a given distance (between 200 and 2,000 
kilometers by regular steps of 200km) – to estimate an empirical cost function.18  
We posit the following parsimonious specification19 whereby the total annual cost C  (in millions 
€) is modeled as a linear function of the distance D  (in 1,000km), the volume shipped Q (in 
MtCO2/y) and the product D Q×  aimed at capturing the interactions between these two variables:    
                                                     
18
 By construction, this approach is similar to the “pseudo data” method proposed to approximate complex engineering 
models using empirically-determined, single-equation cost functions (see e.g., Griffin (1977, 1978, 1979) or Massol  (2011)).  
19
 As there is no theoretical basis on which to select a particular functional form for that cost function, we have also tested a 
variety of other possible specifications including the simpler linear function with two explanatory variables (the distance and 
the volume) and several extensions including either quadratic, cubic or logged values of these variables). However, as the 
goodness-of-fit obtained with these more complex models was not substantially better than that obtained with our simple 
linear model.  
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( )C D Q D Qα β γ δ ε= + + + × +        (D.1) 
where α , β , γ  and δ  are coefficients to be estimated and ε  is an error term.  
An ordinary least squares estimation yields the results presented in Table D.1. The estimated 
coefficients are highly statistically significant, the model has an excellent goodness-of-fit, and its 
residuals show no signs of non-normality. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients are positive, which 
indicates that the cost increases with both the distance and the volume shipped. For a given distance, 
that shipping cost function thus exhibits a positive fixed cost component Dα β+ , and the variable cost 
is linear with a marginal shipping cost that is equal to Dγ δ+ . By construction, the shipping cost 
function obtained for a given distance, thus exhibits pronounced economies of scale.  
Table D.1. Estimation results 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE D.1 HERE] 
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Table 1. The industrial facilities under scrutiny 
Node Facility name Sector Total CO2 
emissions  
(1,000 tCO2/y) 
Biogenic 
emissions 
(1,000 tCO2/y) 
E1 St1 Refinery AB Refinery 522 0 
E2 Bäckhammars Bruk Pulp and Paper 560 552 
E3 Borealis Krackeranl. Petrochemical 642 0 
E4 Skoghalls Bruk Pulp and Paper 1,000 944 
E5 Gruvöns Bruk Pulp and Paper 1,250 1,235 
E6 Södra Cell Värö Pulp and Paper 1,540  1,529 
E7 Preemraff Lysekil Refinery 1,580  0 
TOTAL 7,094 4,260 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Break-even prices obtained under alternative infrastructure operator natures ( =
%) 
 Integration Separation  
with average cost 
pricing 
Separation 
with two-part tariff 
Break-even value 
(€/tCO2) 
112.43 117.27 134.71 
Difference with 
average costs 
+12% +17% +34% 
 
  
  
 
Table B.1. The nodes 
Node Nature Facility name Comment 
E1 Emission St1 Refinery AB Refinery 
E2 Emission Bäckhammars Bruk Pulp and Paper plant 
E3 Emission Borealis Krackeranl. Petrochemical 
E4 Emission Skoghalls Bruk Pulp and Paper plant 
E5 Emission Gruvöns bruk Pulp and Paper plant 
E6 Emission Södra Cell Värö Pulp and Paper plant 
E7 Emission Preemraff Lysekil Refinery 
R1 Routing   
S1 Storage The Norwegian storage site  
 
Table B.2. The candidate pipelines and their lengths 
Pipeline Origin Destination Distance (km) 
P1 E1 E3 72 
P2 E3 E4 30 
P3 E4 R1 168 
P4 R1 E6 28 
P5 R1 E2 60 
P6 E2 E0 54 
P7 E0 E5 70 
P8 E1 E2 217 
P9 E1 E0 238 
P10 E1 E5 284 
 
Table B.3. The candidate shipping lines and their lengths 
Line Origin Destination Distance (km) 
L1 E7 S1 613.0 
L2 E3 S1 638.9 
L3 E1 S1 640.8 
 
  
 
Table C.1. Capture rates and costs in for each emitter (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018) 
Node Sector Total CO2 
emissions 
(1,000 tCO2/y) 
Capture 
rate 
CAPEX 
€/(tCO2/y) 
OPEX 
€/(tCO2/y)  
Total 
€/(tCO2/y) 
E1 Refinery 522 30% 46 42 88 
E2 Pulp and Paper 560 75% 23 42 65 
E3 Petrochemical 642 80% 27 42 69 
E4 Pulp and Paper 1,000 75% 20 42 62 
E5 Pulp and Paper 1,250 75% 18 42 60 
E6 Pulp and Paper 1,540 75% 16 42 58 
E7 Refinery 1,580 30% 22 42 64 
 
 
Table D.1. Estimation results 
 Total annual cost 
Constant 24.051 *** 
 (1.141)  
Distance 2.307 ** 
 (0.920)  
Volume 10.924 *** 
 (0.092)  
(Distance × Volume) 4.004 *** 
 (0.074)  
R2 0.9993  
Adjusted R2 0.9993  
Normality (p-value) 1.178 (0.555) 
Note: The standard deviations of the estimates is reported in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.1*, 0.05** and 
0.01*** levels, respectively. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test for the null hypothesis of normally distributed 
residuals.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: The envisioned BECCS/CCS project: general geography of the emission area in Sweden and the Norwegian storage site and the Swedish 
emission nodes 
  
  
 
 
Figure 2: The candidate pipelines and shipping lines 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: The least costly infrastructure connecting the seven industrial emitters 
  
  
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
Figure 4 Least costly infrastructure for several noteworthy coalitions, respectively: (a): BECCS emitters, (b): CCS emitters, (c): Hinterland emitters, 
(d): Coastal emitters 
  
 
 
Figure 5: Break-even values in each scenario, with different discounting factors 
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Figure 6. Break-even prices for several discounting factors τ 
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Figure 7: Empirical cumulative distribution functions  
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